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This Essay provides an empirical account of attorney fee awards 
over the last decade of patent litigation.  Given the current attention 
in legislative proposals and on the Supreme Court’s docket to more 
liberal fee shifting as a check on abusive patent litigation, a fuller 
descriptive understanding of the current regime is of utmost 
importance to forming sound patent-litigation policy.  Following a 
brief overview of judicial experience in patent cases and trends in 
patent-case filing, this study presents analysis of over 200 attorney fee 
award orders from 2003–2013. 
This study confirms the commonsense view that, in patent 
litigation, plaintiffs tend to receive attorney fee awards more often 
than defendants do, and that such awards are generally larger when 
defendants receive them.  Notably, attorney fee awards are generally 
an order of magnitude lower than prior studies have estimated.  
Attorney fee awards also vary, in magnitude and distribution, 
according to the technology area of the patents involved in the 
dispute.  Finally, attorney fee awards in patent litigation often follow 
systematic calculation and discounting with explanatory discussion, 
reflecting a pattern of fact-intensive evaluation by district judges of 
such awards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After years of reform efforts, the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act (AIA)1 has changed much about the patent system—but perhaps 
not its reputation.  A vocal debate persists about business models that 
are perceived to rely principally on asserting patents rather than on 
practicing their underlying technology through manufacturing or 
licensing.  A decade after Intel general counsel Peter Detkin coined 
the term “patent troll” describing “somebody who tries to make a lot 
of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no 
intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced,”2 the AIA 
itself created a host of legal mechanisms to respond to this set of 
business models.  In administrative practice, such mechanisms include 
(1) amended inter partes review and a new post-grant review to 
invalidate existing patents of dubious quality,3 (2) a transitional 
program for challenging the validity of certain business method 
patents4 (which figure in abusive litigation to a debated extent5), (3) 
and an ability for third parties to submit prior art for consideration 
toward pending applications to improve patent quality going 
forward.6  In litigation, such mechanisms include (1) stricter joinder 
rules to discourage shackling numerous unrelated defendants to each 
other in a single lawsuit,7 (2) an infringement defense based on prior 
 
 1.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.). 
 2.  See Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, THE 
RECORDER (July 30, 2001), available at http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf. 
 3.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6, 125 Stat. at 299–313 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (amending the inter partes review provisions in Chapter 31 of 
Title 35 and creating a new set of post-grant review provisions in a new Chapter 32). 
 4.  See id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31. 
 5.  Compare, e.g., Bernard Chao, Finding the Point of Novelty in Software Patents, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1227 (2013) (arguing that “the non-practicing entity problem is 
greater with respect to business method patents than to industrial software patents”), with 
Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 477 (2012) (arguing that 
“business methods are a relatively small part of NPE litigation”). 
 6.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 8, 125 Stat. at 316 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 
122(e)). 
 7.  See id. § 19(d)(1), 125 Stat. at 332–33 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299).  The new joinder 
rule prohibits jointly suing multiple defendants in a single infringement action based solely on 
the assertion of a patent or set of patents common to all.  Id. Prior to the AIA, this tactic often 
hobbled the ability of defendants to coordinate litigation strategy or vindicate individual 
interests. An interesting effect of the new joinder rule has been a rise in separate patent 
lawsuits, and a recent empirical study has shown that this rise is an artifact of § 299 rather than a 
genuine rise in litigation.  See Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, 
Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) 37 (Nov. 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
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commercial use to strengthen the hand of firms already practicing 
later-patented technology,8 (3) and a bar on using a defendant’s 
failure to obtain advice of counsel as evidence of willful or induced 
infringement.9 
Yet for all these patent-specific reforms, structural criticisms 
linger that patent trolls are largely immune from countersuit precisely 
because they do not practice but only threaten and sue10 and that the 
high cost of patent litigation creates a settlement threshold below 
which rational firms will pay to avoid dubious or even frivolous claims 
rather than bear the higher costs of litigation to vindication.11  A 
notable manifestation of this latter criticism is renewed interest in fee 
shifting as a policy lever, and in 35 U.S.C. § 285, which provides for 
fee shifting in “exceptional” cases. 
I.  LITIGATION TRENDS AND THE ENTHUSIASM FOR PATENT FEE 
SHIFTING 
Much of this renewed interest proceeds from the famously high 
cost of patent litigation against the backdrop of the experience of 
judges with patent cases.  Patent litigation has a history of forum 
shopping12 as well as a reputation for favored judicial districts and 
 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2346381. 
 8.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 5, 125 Stat. at 297–99 (to be codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 273).  The nontransferable, in personam nature of the defense underscores its objective 
as a shield for economically productive activity rather than as a general weapon against patent 
rights. 
 9.  See id. § 17, 125 Stat. at 329 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 298). 
 10.  E.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 413 (2014).  But see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the 
Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 430 n.28 (2014) 
(observing that “practicing-entity patent plaintiffs have several additional avenues of settlement 
available that NPEs do not,” such as cross-licensing among industry actors and leveraging 
outside business relationships). 
 11.  See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1–2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146251.  Pure 
nuisance-value suits are only one kind of such abusive litigation, and perhaps not the most 
troubling.  See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2170 (2013) (observing that “[w]hile trolls do appear more likely to 
engage in abusive conduct like nuisance-value litigation, not all trolls engage in such conduct, 
and practicing entities also engage in their own forms of abusive conduct”).  
 12.  For detailed empirical discussion of forum shopping in patent litigation, see generally 
Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John L. Turner, The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: 
Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411 (2009); Kimberly A. 
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 83 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 558 (2001). 
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“rocket dockets.”13  Indeed, the majority of attorney fee awards 
analyzed in this study arose in just such a concentration of judicial 
districts.14  Thus, the exposure of judges to patent cases has also been 
heterogeneous.  Of the nearly 1,000 judges who presided over patent 
cases from 1995–2003, for example, a few saw over 100 cases, but 
nearly 40 percent saw fewer than a handful: 
 
Table 1. Categories of Judges by Patent Cases Heard (1995–2003)15 
Cases 
Heard > 100 51–100 21–50 10–20 5–9 < 5 
Judges 4 
(0.3%) 
34 
(2.9%) 
215 
(18.1%)
254 
(21.4%)
215 
(18.1%)
467 
(39.3%) 
 
As for the cost of patent litigation, much empirical literature has 
relied on the American Intellectual Property Law Association’s 
biannual survey regarding attorney incomes, demographics, billing 
rates, and other economic data for a benchmark.16  The most recent 
survey reports the median expense of patent litigation, inclusive of all 
costs, as follows: 
 
Table 2. Median Patent-Infringement Litigation Costs (Thousands)17 
Amount at Risk 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
< $1M $650 $600 $650 $650 $700 
$1M-$10M n/a n/a n/a n/a $2,000 
$10M-$25M n/a n/a n/a n/a $3,325 
$1M-$25M $2,000 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,600 
> $25M $4,500 $5,000 $5,500 $5,000 $5,500 
 
 13.  Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of 
Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 58, 60 (2011). 
 14.  See infra Part II.B tbls.6–8 and accompanying discussion. 
 15.  Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and 
Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent 
Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 447 (2011). 
 16.  See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10 at 393; Lemley & Melamed, supra note 11 at 
2126; Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 10 at 438 n.65.  See also, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Four 
Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 741 (2011); Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving 
the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 305 (2012). 
 17.  AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34 (2013) 
[hereinafter AIPLA Survey]. 
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Under the American Rule, each side pays its own costs.18  The 
rise in costs has led to recent literature revisiting the appropriate role 
of the American Rule in patent litigation.19 
A.  In the Congress 
For its part, Congress has been receptive to this literature, with 
three House bills and two Senate bills in the last two years providing 
for some form of fee shifting as a check on patent litigation abuse.  
Even the brief time in which these bills have emerged has produced 
striking evolution in the approach of Congress to fee-shifting, from 
early attempts at targeted change to broader but more well-
developed proposals for systemic reform. 
In the House of Representatives, the Saving High-Tech 
Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act was first 
introduced in August, 2012, to address litigation over “computer 
hardware or software” patents.20  For reasons including the difficulty 
of defining such patents ex ante, the bill was reintroduced in April, 
2013, to address all patent litigation.21  The current bill singles out 
patentees who neither (1) had a hand in obtaining the patent, nor (2) 
have substantial documented investment in practicing the patent, nor 
(3) are universities or technology transfer organizations—and 
requires attorney fees for any challenger of patent validity or 
infringement who prevails over these patentees unless exceptional 
circumstances exist.22  Thus, it reverses the current § 285 presumption 
and asymmetrically penalizes only a nonprevailing patentee.  Notably, 
the bill does not furnish its own definition of “exceptional” cases, 
leaving intact the existing common law.23 
 
 18.  See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The 
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993). 
 19.  Compare, e.g., Emily H. Chen, Note, Making Abusers Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation 
By Shifting Attorneys’ Fees, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 351, 381 (2013) (supporting mandatory fee 
shifting), with Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 59, 66 (2013) (arguing that fee shifting should not be the default rule, only used more 
liberally under 35 U.S.C. § 285 where appropriate). 
 20.  H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 21.  H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013).  See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 
HOUS. L. REV. 325, 358 (2012) (discussing the broad, potentially overbroad, definition of 
software patents proposed by H.R. 6245). 
 22.  H.R. 845 § 2.  
 23.  See Part I.B, infra. 
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Even more recent and further along in the legislative process is 
the Innovation Act, introduced in late October 2013.24  Following 
passage by the House six weeks later, it is currently before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary.25  The Innovation Act also reverses the § 
285 presumption in favor of fee shifting, but symmetrically applies to 
non-prevailing parties regardless of litigant posture and provides 
additional safeguards, including an exception for economic hardship 
and a requirement for a party to certify its ability to pay shifted fees if 
it does not prevail.26  Moreover, the bill does specify that a non-
prevailing party may overcome the new presumption by showing that 
its legal position and conduct were “reasonably justified” in law and 
fact.27 
The Senate counterparts to these bills have proceeded similarly.  
The Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, introduced in May 2013, 
departed just as the Innovation Act later would from asymmetric fee 
shifting, to apply broadly to all parties.28  It, too, reverses the § 285 
presumption and specifies that a non-prevailing party may overcome 
it if its legal position and conduct were “objectively reasonable and 
substantially justified,” or “exceptional” circumstances exist.29  
Likewise, the Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 201330 requires a legal 
position and conduct that were “substantially justified” or that 
“special” circumstances exist.31  Most recently, the substance of both 
Senate bills was the subject of a hearing last December before the full 
Judiciary Committee.32 
In support of these Congressional proposals, the White House 
has also advocated greater liberality in statutory fee shifting.  This has 
occurred both in the form of a legislative recommendation for greater 
 
 24.  H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 9, 2013). 
 25.  ACTIONS: H.R. 3309—113TH CONGRESS (2013-2014), 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3309/all-actions/ (last visited Mar. 18, 
2014). 
 26.  H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 9, 
2013). 
 27.  Id. § 3(b)(1).  The requirement as to litigation “conduct” was added in a Manager’s 
Amendment.  H. Amdt. 520, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 28.  S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 29.  Id. § 5(a). 
 30.  S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 31.  Id. § 101(a). 
 32.  Protecting Small Businesses and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent Troll Abuse: 
Hearing on S. 1013 and S. 1612 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong (2013). 
VISHNUBHAKAT IN FR (ALEX) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2014  10:19 AM 
2014]  ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS IN PATENT LITIGATION 21 
judicial discretion under § 285,33 as well as an endorsement of the 
Innovation Act, including that bill’s provisions for “reducing 
unnecessary costs of patent litigation.”34 
Thus, together with other structural legislation such as proposed 
heightened pleading standards for patent cases35 and with executive 
actions such as recently proposed requirements for ongoing disclosure 
of the real parties in interest behind patent owners of record,36 fee 
shifting in patent litigation appears to be arriving at a stable 
consensus in Congress—indeed, both political branches—on its 
desirability, substantive standards, and applicable scope.  Even so, the 
current regime of § 285 is also before the Supreme Court as to these 
same questions of standard and scope. 
B.  In the Courts 
The standard under § 285—what is an “exceptional” case?—is 
the subject of Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.37  
Both firms manufacture elliptical exercise machines, in which a stroke 
rail connecting the mobile foot rail to the front frame is the subject of 
Icon’s U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710.38  The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Minnesota granted Octane summary judgment of 
noninfringement39 and found the case unexceptional.40  The Federal 
Circuit affirmed and declined what it saw as Octane’s invitation to 
“lower the standard for exceptionality to ‘objectively unreasonable’ 
to rebalance what it alleges is the power of large companies over 
 
 33.  See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’, Fact Sheet: White House 
Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-
tech-patent-issues. 
 34.  See Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy 
on H.R. 3309–Innovation Act (Dec. 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saphr3309r_20131203.pdf. 
 35.  See S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013); H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (as referred to the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 9, 2013). 
 36.  Changes To Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105 
(proposed Jan 24., 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 37.  Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App’x 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1184). 
 38.  Id. at 59–60. 
 39.  Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 09-319, 2011 WL 2457914, at 
*1 (D. Minn. June 17, 2011). 
 40.  Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 09-319, 2011 WL 3900975, at 
*4 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2011). 
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smaller companies” in patent litigation.41  Octane contests the Federal 
Circuit’s “rigid and exclusive two-part test” as an intrusion on district 
judge discretion and an asymmetric burden on accused infringers.42 
The practical scope of § 285—via deference to district court 
findings on exceptionality—is the subject of Highmark Inc. v. Allcare 
Health Management Systems, Inc.43  The case is between Pennsylvania 
insurance firm Highmark and accused patent troll Allcare, which 
unsuccessfully asserted against Highmark Allcare’s U.S. Patent No. 
5,301,105 directed to certain managed health care systems.44  The U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas found the case 
exceptional and awarded Highmark attorney fees.45  Reviewing 
exceptionality de novo, the Federal Circuit reversed in part, 
concluding that because certain of Allcare positions were not 
“objectively unreasonable”46 and Allcare had not engaged in litigation 
misconduct,47 the case was not exceptional in those respects.48  
Highmark contests de novo scrutiny as the incorrect standard of 
review for § 285.49 
Given the postures of the cases in relation to each other, it would 
certainly be appropriate for the legal standard for § 285 that emerges 
from Octane Fitness to influence or even determine the standard of 
review that emerges from Highmark.  That is, a broader grant of 
discretion to district court judges in finding cases exceptional under § 
285, as Octane proposes, is consistent with a grant of greater 
deference to those findings, as Highmark proposes—indeed, these are 
the very positions that the United States as amicus curiae has taken in 
the respective cases.50 
 
 41.  Icon Health, 496 F. App’x. at 65. 
 42.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Icon Health, 496 F. App’x 57 (No. 12-1184). 
 43.  Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 687 F.3d 1300,(Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 
81 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1163). 
 44.  Id. at 1306. 
 45.  Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 713, 738 (N.D. Tex. 
2010).  The court relied on § 285 as well as Rule 11. Id. at 735–37. 
 46.  Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.LW. 3562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1163). 
 47.  Id. at 1316–18. 
 48.  Id. at 1319. 
 49.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Highmark, 687 F.3d 1300 (No. 12-1163). 
 50.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Icon Health & 
Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App’x 57 (Fed. Cir 2012) (No. 12-1185); Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Highmark, 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (No. 12-1163). 
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Thus, Octane’s descriptions of Icon as a large patent-holding 
interest restraining competition and Highmark’s accusations of 
trolling behavior by Allcare are of a piece with the broader narrative 
of economic harm from abusive patent assertion.  Yet apart from 
patent doctrine and statutory construction, ongoing commentary has 
also pointed out that Icon is a significant market actor and producer, 
not the generally assertion-oriented troll that Octane addresses in its 
larger policy argument.51 
What is more, Octane’s proposed looser standard contemplates 
only one basis for finding a case exceptional under § 285—that of 
“vexatious and unjustified” litigation—and ignores fee awards that 
punish litigation misconduct, willful infringement, or fraud on the 
USPTO.52  Though litigation misconduct is at issue in Highmark, the 
logically prior question presented in Octane Fitness leaves open the 
question of precisely how forceful a policy response to abusive patent 
litigation the facts in these two cases can support. 
In both the legislative and judicial settings, however, the debate 
over how much more effective a mechanism fee shifting ought to be 
for mediating patent litigation invites a descriptive account of its 
current use. 
II.  TEN YEARS OF ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS IN PATENT LITIGATION 
A.  Data, Methodology, and Prior Estimates 
To provide such an account, this study evaluated attorney fee 
award data from the DocketNavigator litigation research service,53 
which draws all of its underlying patent litigation docket information 
and court documents from the Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records (PACER) service.54 
A search of DocketNavigator produced 243 cases in which a U.S. 
district court in a patent case awarded attorney fees.  By comparison 
to original court filing information from PACER, DocketNavigator’s 
coverage of patent case filings prior to the early 2000s is somewhat 
 
 51.  See, e.g., Ronald Mann, Argument Preview: Justices To Assess Attorney’s Fees in Patent 
Litigation (Twice in One Day!), SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 24, 2014), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/argument-preview-justices-to-assess-attorneys-fees-in-
patent-litigation-twice-in-one-day/. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  DocketNavigator, available at http://home.docketnavigator.com/. 
 54.  PACER, available at http://www.pacer.gov/. 
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poor, though its coverage steadily improves up to current calendar 
years.55  For that reason, the 16 oldest data points were dropped so 
that the observation window became 2003–2013, leaving 227 attorney 
fee awards.  In addition to limiting the observation, the study also 
omitted those attorney fee awards which the fee award orders 
expressly identified as remedying litigation misconduct unrelated to 
35 U.S.C. § 285 (e.g., under Rule 11), though these are arguably still 
relevant to the dynamics of patent litigation expense for plaintiffs and 
defendants.  These totaled 11 further removals from the data, leaving 
216 attorney fee awards. 
Notwithstanding the question of DocketNavigator’s general data 
coverage, for attorney fee awards in particular, the current data 
closely matches that of a prior empirical study on the incidence (but 
not amounts) of attorney fee awards over the same time period.56  
Liang & Berliner found 208 attorney fee awards from 2003 to May 15, 
2013,57 compared to this study’s 216.  This independent confirmation 
of the number of relevant exceptional case findings assures against 
biased or nonrandom omissions of attorney fee awards in the present 
study. 
Relatedly, a summary examination of attorney fee awards in 
patent litigation from 1985–2004 found partial data on the set of 137 
fee awards: award amounts were apparent in 87 cases.58  From this 
data, Professors Bessen and Meurer observed median attorney fee 
awards of $400,000 for patentees who prevail at summary judgment, 
of $780,000 for patentees who prevail at trial, of $300,000 for alleged 
infringers who prevail at summary judgment, and of $980,000 for 
alleged infringers who prevail at trial.59  Their finding, notably, was 
consistent with AIPLA Survey data from 2001.60 
 
 55.  Coverage refers to data available in DocketNavigator as compared to the source data 
available in PACER.  A comparison of data on overall annual patent case filings shows that 
DocketNavigator’s annual coverage is less than 30 percent for cases filed before 2001, but is 
over 80 percent for cases 2006 onward and over 90 percent for 2008 onward. 
 56.  Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 59 
(2013). 
 57.  Id. at 87. 
 58.  James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 59, 80–82 (2012). 
 59.  Id. at 81 tbl.6. 
 60.  Id. The 2001 AIPLA Survey estimated that litigation cost through trial was $499,000 
when the stakes were less than $1 million, $1,499,000 when the stakes were between $1 million 
and $25 million, and $2,992,000 when the stakes were greater than $25,000,000.  Id. at 81–82; cf. 
supra note 17, and accompanying table (showing a marked increase from 2001). 
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B.  Discussion 
Consistent with Liang and Berliner and with Bessen and Meurer, 
this study finds that about 71% of attorney fee awards go to plaintiffs 
and about 29% to defendants.61  Inconsistent with Bessen and 
Meurer, however, the magnitudes of fee awards more clearly favor 
defendants from 2003–2013.62  At the median, attorney fee awards 
made to defendants were about 2.4-fold more than those to plaintiffs.  
Adding back in the 11 attorney fee awards for non-§ 285 reasons such 
as litigation misconduct, plaintiffs’ median remains about the same, 
but defendants’ median rises by nearly 50%, leading to a 3.3-fold 
disparity.  These findings are further illustrated in Tables 3 and 4 and 
Figure 1. 
 
Table 3. Median Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Litigation for 
Plaintiffs and Defendants (2003–2013) 
 
Based on § 285 
(n = 216 cases) 
Also Including Non-§ 
285 
(n = 227 cases) 
Plaintiffs $46,354.00 $45,287.00 
Defendants $109,466.00 $148,430.00 
Disparity 2.4-fold higher for 
defendants 
3.3-fold higher for 
defendants 
 
  
 
 61.  Liang and Berliner found a 68%-32% split (142 plaintiff awards and 66 defendant 
awards).  See Liang & Berliner, supra note 56, at 87–88.  Bessen and Meurer also found a 68%–
32% split (59 patentee awards and 28 alleged infringer awards).  See Bessen & Meurer, supra 
note 58, at 81 tbl.6. 
 62.  Bessen and Meurer found only a 1.26-fold difference for post-trial fee awards to 
alleged infringers versus patentees during 1985–2004.  See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 58, at 
81 tbl.6. 
VISHNUBHAKAT IN FR (ALEX) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2014  10:19 AM 
26 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 63:2 
Table 4. Distribution of Attorney Fee Awards for Plaintiffs and 
Defendants (2003–2013) 
Range Plaintiff Defendant 
$0–1K 4 0 
$1K–10K 27 2 
$10K–100K 62 24 
$100K–1M 39 22 
$1M–10M 21 13 
$10M–100M 0 2 
All 153 (70.8%) 63 (29.2%)
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Litigation for 
Plaintiffs and Defendants (2003–2013) 
 
In a marked departure from Professors Bessen and Meurer’s 
findings, observed median attorney fee awards from 2003–2013 were 
about an order of magnitude lower than the seven-figure estimates 
that correspond with 2001 AIPLA data.63  This discrepancy between 
fees charged and fees awarded suggests that district judges may apply 
discounting as well. 
Attorney-fee-award amounts also varied by technology.  Using 
the well-established Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg (HJT) typology64 that 
 
 63.  See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 64.  See generally Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER 
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maps U.S. Patent Classification categories65 to six broad technology 
categories, each patent case is identifiable by the technology 
classifications of the patents involved in that case.66 
Comparing across technologies as shown in Table 5 and Figure 2, 
the distributions of attorney fee awards vary in both magnitude and 
skew.  For example, “Chemical” cases saw 10 fee awards, but 
“Computers & Communications” cases saw 42.  Fee awards skewed 
toward the $1K–$10K range for “Computers & Communications” 
and “Drugs & Medical” cases, but “Mechanical” cases saw more 
$100K–1 million awards, and “Electrical and Electronic” cases saw 
more awards over $10 million. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Litigation for 
Plaintiffs and Defendants (2003–2013) 
Range C
he
m
ic
al
 
C
om
pu
te
rs
 &
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 
D
ru
gs
 &
 M
ed
ic
al
 
E
le
ct
ri
ca
l &
 
E
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
M
ec
ha
ni
ca
l 
O
th
er
s 
$0–1K 0 0 0 0 1 3 
$1K–10K 0 4 2 6 3 13 
$10K–100K 5 18 14 6 9 29 
$100k–1M 2 10 10 9 15 17 
$1M–10M 3 9 4 10 5 11 
$10M–100M 0 1 1 0 0 0 
All 
10 
(4.5%)
42 
(19.1%)
31 
(14.1%)
31 
(14.1%)
33 
(15.0%)
73 
(33.2%) 
 
 
 
Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, NBER Working Paper 
8498 (2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498. 
 65.  See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Office of Patent Classification, 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/index.jsp. 
 66.  Though most multi-patent cases fell into a single technology, some multiple-
technology designations did occur. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Litigation by 
Technology (2003–2013) 
 
 
Finally, a review of the attorney fee award orders themselves 
reveals interrelated trends pertaining to judicial experience with 
patent cases. 
First, attorney fee awards in patent cases appear to reflect a 
distribution of judicial experience similar to that which patent cases 
reflect more generally.  Districts where fee awards originate are much 
the same as where litigants file patent cases in general.  As Table 6 
shows, a large plurality of attorney fee awards in patent litigation 
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during 2003–2013 came from a small number of districts.  As Tables 7 
and 8 further show, the six districts that produced over 40 percent of 
fee awards were also among the leading districts in filings. 
Table 6. Distribution of Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Litigation 
Across Judicial Districts (2003–2013) 
Awards 1 2–6 7–12 13–18 19–24 25–30 31–36 37–42 
Districts 22 24 6 1 0 0 0 1 
Table 7. Judicial Districts That Produced the Most Attorney Fee 
Awards in Patent Litigation (2003–2013) 
District Awards Based 
on § 285 
 
(n = 216 cases) 
Awards  Based
on § 285 and 
Non-§ 285 
(n = 227 cases) 
C.D. Cal. 38 40 
N.D. Cal. 15 16 
N.D. Ill. 11 11 
S.D. Cal. 10 11 
N.D. Ga. 10 10 
E.D. Tex. 8 10 
Subtotal 92 (42.6%) 98 (43.4%) 
Table 8. Nationwide Rank in Patent Case Filings of Judicial Districts 
That Produced the Most Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Litigation 
(2003–2013) 
District ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 
C.D. Cal. 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 4 3 3 3 
N.D. Cal. 2 2 2 3 6 4 4 5 4 4 4 
N.D. Ill. 3 3 4 6 5 6 6 3 5 5 6 
S.D. Cal. 13 15 13 13 9 8 8 13 10 9 5 
N.D. Ga. 21 13 11 8 11 11 16 16 17 16 18 
E.D. Tex. 15 8 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
 
Second, many of the patent attorney fee award orders themselves 
show systematic calculation of the attorney fees incurred by 
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prevailing parties as well as subsequent discounting by the district 
judge, that is, in the interest of fairness or to mitigate perceived 
overbilling, duplicative work product, and the like.  For example, of 
the patent attorney fee award orders reviewed, 45 orders expressly 
discuss a lodestar calculation in determining the amount of the fee 
award.67  The lodestar method has been the general rule for attorney 
fee award calculations for over 30 years since the Supreme Court 
adopted it in Hensley v. Eckerhart68 relying, in turn, on the fact-
intensive twelve-part analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. 
Georgia Highway Express, Inc.69  Given its widespread use, the 45 
orders are likely an undercount of how many fee awards overall rely 
on the lodestar approach implicitly, e.g., through attorney briefings or 
magistrate recommendations on the issue. 
This discursive application of the lodestar method is important 
because despite the method’s well-established usage, a significant 
portion of fee awards still apply it, not as rote affair, but with 
deliberate attention to the facts at hand.  The 45 orders represent 25 
different judicial districts, nearly half (and a disproportionately active 
half at that) of the 54 districts that produced attorney fee awards in 
patent litigation from 2003–2013.  These 25 districts account for 145 
fee awards, or two-thirds of all 216 fee awards.  Not least, the six 
districts that led in attorney fee awards in patent litigation and led 
among patent case filings more generally70 were also all represented 
among the 45 orders that expressly discuss the lodestar method. 
CONCLUSION 
To a considerable degree, therefore, judges’ awards of patent 
attorney fees reflect their growing experience and familiarity with 
patent cases as well as their fact-intensive evaluation of litigation 
costs, notwithstanding the variety of fee awards that results across 
litigant posture or technology. 
 
 
 67.  For a concise discussion of the lodestar method, see, for example, George B. Murr, 
Analysis of the Valuation of Attorney Work Product According to the Market For Claims: 
Reformulating the Lodestar Method, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 599, 602–09 (2000).  The lodestar 
method begins by multiplying the reasonably expended amount of attorney time by a 
reasonable rate of compensation, followed by adjustment of the initial estimate based on the 
circumstances of the case. 
 68.  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). 
 69.  Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 70.  See supra Part II.B tbls.7–8. 
